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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * *
MARVIN L. WOODWARD,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
-vsMILDRED L. WOODWARD,
Defendant and
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 18089

* * * * * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a portion of the Decree of
Divorce awarding Respondent a one-fourth interest in any
retirement benefits Appellant receives, as he receives them.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The parties were divorced on October 9, 1981.

The

trial court, Honorable Venoy Christoffersen, presiding, made
a roughly equal· division of all marriage assets with the
exception of the husband's civil service retirement.

1
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The

retirement asset was isolated from all other assets in the
court's property division, and the court awarded to the wife
a one-fourth interest in all proceeds received through said
retirement plan, as they are received by the husband.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-Respondent seeks an affirmation of the trial
court's division of the assets of the parties including the
disposition of the civil service retirement.
Defendant-Respondent also requests that the case be remanded
to the trial court for an additional award of attorney's
fees incurred on appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The parties' divorce trial was heard on October 9, 1981
with the Honorable Venoy Christoffersen, District Judge,
presiding.

The court entered its decision awarding the

divorce to Plaintiff-Appellant on his complaint, as well as
to Defendant-Respondent on her counterclaim (T-76).

(For

purposes of clarity, Plaintiff-Appellant will hereafter be
referred to as husband, and Defendant-Respondent will
hereafter be referred to as wife).

custody of the four

minor children and possession of the home were not contested

2
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by the wife, and were subsequently awarded by the court to
the husband.
The court isolated the husband's retirement benefit
from all other items of property, both real and personal.
The court then made a roughly equal division of these other
assets (T-69 to 71).
With regards to the civil service retirement, the court
found that the husband had worked for civil service for 15
years, approximately the same length of time as the parties'
marriage (R-71).

The court reasoned that since he would

have to work another 15 years to obtain full retirement
benefits, the wife would be entitled to one-fourth of his
ultimate benefit, in other words, one-half of the amount
accumulated by the husband during the marriage (T-72).

The

court did not mandate that this include amounts contributed
by the government, rather the court indicated that the award
would include amounts contributed by the government only if
the husband actually receives such benefits (T-72).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS CASE IS CLEARLY DISTINGUISHED
FROM THE BENNETT CASE.
The appellant cites as sole authority for his position
the case of Bennett v. Bennett 607 P.2d 839 (Utah 1980).

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There are one or two similarities between the cases.

In

both cases the husband-appellant was a civilian employee
working at Hill Force Base.

As such, they were covered

under the same civil service plan.

At this point the

similarities between the two cases end.

Bennett

In the Bennett case, the trial judge made a lump sum
distribution of the retirement benefit.
of several important factors.

This was the result

First, the trial judge valued

the husband's retirement at a specific dollar figure,
apparently including therein so-called "matching funds" from
the government.
Second, in Bennett the retirement fund was treated as
one component of the entire marital assets ..

By awarding

the entire retirement fund to the husband in his portion of
the assets, the trial court placed the burden entirely on
him for all future contingencies concerning the retirement
fund.
Third, alternative ways for disposition of the
retirement fund were not considered in the Bennett case,
either at the trial level or on appeal.

A review of the

Bennett opinion and the briefs filed in connection with
the case makes clear that no one ever raised the possibility
of a "time rule" approach.

(This will be discussed

4
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hereafter).

Additionally, in the present case appellant

formulates the issue before the court as one involving
"non-vested retirement benefits".

The terms "vested" and

"non-vested" appear nowhere in the Bennett opinion.
Fourth, there is in civil service retirement no such
thing as a "matching amount from the government".

This is

borne out by the explanation of benefits made in the copy of
the plan admitted into evidence.

(R-31 Part III)

This is

also supported by language from the Bennett opinion.
"The retirement officer further testified,
'the amount of money that he (plaintiff)
has in the retirement fund does not have any
bearing on what he would get under retirement monthly annuity.'" Bennett supra 840.
Because of the foregoing it was clearly error for the trial
judge in Bennett to attempt to place a dollar value on the
retirement fund including "matching funds from the
government" and allocate the entire amount as a lump sum in
the husband's portion

of the property division.

Woodward

The trial judge in the present case applied the "time
rule" in making an equitable distribution of the retirement
fund asset.

The time rule is based on the concept that the

non-employee spouse's share in the retirement fund is
directly proportionate to the amount of time the spouse

5
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contributed to that fund during the marriage.

Thus, the

time rule determines marital interest in a retirement fund
by computing the ratio of the time of marriage during which
pension benefits were earned to the total years of service
during which the pension is earned.

This percentage is then

applied against the retirement income received.

The

non-employee spouse would then receive one-half of this
amount as representing her half of the marital asset.
By applying the time rule, the judge treated the
retirement fund entirely different from the trial court's
approach in the Bennett case in several significant aspects.
First, in the present case no specific dollar amount was
ever assigned to the retirement fund as a marriage asset
{T-7 2) .
Second, the retirement fund was isolated from all other
marital assets and disposed of separately.

The court made

an equitable division of all marriage assets except the
retirement fund awarding roughly one-half of the value of
these to each party {T-70,71).

The court then turned to the

retirement fund and made an equitable division thereof
{T-71,72).

The court in effect divided two pies.

The

wisdom in this approach is that it does not place an undue
burden on either party ~or future contingencies concerning
the asset.

Both parties bear this burden in direct

relation to their proportionate interest in the asset.

6
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Third, in the present case other alternatives for
disposition of the retirement fund were considered and
rejected by the court.

The wife's proposed division of the

major marital assets suggested the court make a lump sum
distribution of the retirement fund (T-55,56).

The

rejection of this proposal in favor of the time rule
approach demonstrates the wisdom of an experienced trial
judge.
Fourth, the time rule approach eliminates the need for
an abstr.act discussion concerning such concepts as matching
funds, vesting, non-vesting, etc.

Regardless of what future

contingencies occur, the parties know with certainty what
proportions they will receive, thus equitable division of
the marriage assets is guaranteed.

POINT II
OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE ADOPTED
THE TIME RULE APPROACH IN SIMILAR
CASES.
In view of the foregoing discussion of the significant
distinctions between the Bennett case and this case,
Respondent submits that the issue presently before the court
is:
"Are non-vested pension benefits contingent property interests rather than
mere expectancies?"

7
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It appears that this is an issue of first impression in our
jurisdiction.

However, it has been litigated in a number of

other states; most significantly, California.

The Brown Case

In 1976, the California Supreme Court issued its
decision in the case of In Re Marriage of Brown 544 P.2d 561
(Cal. 1976), Respondent Robert Brown had worked for the
telephone company during most of the marriage.

At trial the

court refused to consider the non-vested pension rights of
the husband as

community property, even though he had

accumulated 72/78ths of the time necessary to qualify for
retirement benefits.

Writing for a unanimous court, Justice

Tobriner reversed a 35 year old precedent, and stated:
" ... Non-vested pension rights are not an
expectancy but a contingent interest in
property; •.. Pension rights, whether or not
vested, represent a property interest; to
the extent that such rights derived from
empioyment during coverture, they comprise
a community asset subject to division in a
dissolution proceeding." Brown Supra 562,
563.
The court then defined the differences between
non-vested pension rights and a mere expectancy.
"The term expectancy describes the interest
of a person who merely foresees that he
might receive a future beneficence, such
as the interest of an heir apparent ••• , or
of a beneficiary designated by a living
insured who has a right to change the
beneficiary ... As these examples demonstrate,
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the defining characteristic of an expectancy is that its holder has no enforceable
right to his beneficence.
Although some jurisdictions classify retirement pensions as gratuities, it has long
been settled that under California law such
benefits 'do not derive from the beneficence of the employer, but are properly
part of the consideration earned by the
employee'" •.. the employee's right to such
benfits is a contractual right, derived
from the terms of the employment contract .
•.. a contractual right is not an expectancy
but a chose in action, a form of property.

. . .

We conclude that French v French, and subsequent cases erred in characterizing nonvested
pension rights as expectancies and in denying
the trial courts the authority to divide such
rights as community property. This mischaracterization of pension rights has, and unless
overturned, will continue to result in inequitable division of community assets. Over the
past decades, pension benefits have become an
increasingly significant part of the consideration earned by the employee for his services."
Brown Supra, pages 565, 566.
The court then turned to the practical question of how
to distribute such a community asset.
" .•. if the court concludes that because of
uncertainties affecting the vesting or
maturation of the pension that it should
not attempt to divide the present value of
pension rights, it can instead award each
spouse an appropriate portion of each
pension payment as it is paid. This method
of dividing the community interest in the .
pension renders it unnecessary for the court
to compute the present value of the pension
rights, and divides equally the risk that
the pension will fail to vest." Brown Supra
567.

9
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It is, of course, to be noted that California is a
community property state, and Utah is not.

However, for

purposes of treatment of retirement benefits, the
distinction is not significant.

Whether these pension

rights are termed "community property" or a "marital asset",
practical concepts of equity and fairness mandate the
same result.

Additionally it would appear Utah Law

sanctions this result inasmuch as the relevant state statute
requires the trial court to "make such orders in relation to
the ... property ... as may be equitable." (See U.C.A. 30-3-5
1953 as amended).

Other Community Property States Have
Also Required an Equitable Division
Of Non-Vested Pension Rights

In the same year as the Brown decision, the Supreme
Court of Texas addressed this issue.

The Texas opinion,

Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Texas 1976), quotes
extensively from Brown and establishes that all pension
interests, whether vested or non-vested, are community
property subject to division in divorce proceedings.
time rule as previously discussed is the standard for
allocation.

10
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The

The State of Washington has been the earliest in
holding that unvested pension interests are subject to
distribution in divorce proceedings.

Perhaps the best

evidence of this comes from a concise statement and
citations contained in the opinion of the court in In Re
Marriage of Pea, 566 P.2d 212 (Washington 1977).

At page

213, writing for a unanimous court, Judge Pearson stated:
"It is clear that retirement pay even
though benefits are not presently
available, is held to be deferred compensation and subject to equitable
distribution under RCW 26.09.080."
Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash.2d 364, 534
P.ed 1355 (1975); DeRevere v. DeRevere,
5. Wash.App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971).
A Number of Common Law States
Have Also Treated Non-Vested Retirement Benefits
As Marriage Assets
The New Jersey courts have consistently held pension
benefits to be marital property, without any reference to
"vesting".

In the case of Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257

(New Jersey 1975) at page 262 the court stated:
"We take the opportunity •.. to suggest
that the concept of vesting should
probably find no significant place in
the developing law of equitable distribution."
Most recently in Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76 (New
Jersey 1981), the following clarification was made as to the
law in the state of New Jersey.
" .•. where other assets for equitable
distribution are inadequate or lacking
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altogether, or where no present value
can be established and the parties are
unable to reach agreement, resort must
be had to a form of deferred distribution
based upon fixed percentages. In such
event, the trial judge must determine
how best to accomplish equitable distribution of all distributable property
including, as appropriate, the sharing
in fixed percentages of the pension
payments when received. Kikkert Supra 80.
The Wisconsin courts have likewise held pension
interests includable as marital property, and have noted
that this is of ten the largest available asset in the
marital estate. Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 226 N.W.2d 518
(1975).
Most recently in the case of Selchert v. Selchert, 280
N.W.2d 293 (Wisconsin 1979), the court of appeals stated:
" ... the trial court could use a method
widely employed in other states, whereby
the trial court determines what percentage
of the marital property each spouse is to
receive, and then divides payments from
the pension plan accordingly. Under this
approach it is unnecessary to make any
determination as to the value of the pension
fund.
The only consideration is the appropriate percentage of the marital property to
which each spouse is entitled ••• When the beneficiary spouse then opts to receive payments
under the pension plan, the non-covered
spouse would be entitled to her established
percentage of those payments ... This method
may be particularly appropriate where the
present value of a pension fund is very
difficult or impossible to assess.
Selchert Supra. 298.
In a 1978 case the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Elliot
v. Elliot 274 N.W.2d 75 (Minn.1978), observed that other

12
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jurisdictions have almost unanimously ruled that such
pension benefits are property.

(See Footnote 8 at page 77

of the opinion, which catalogs the various jurisdictions.)

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED.
While many states have not yet ruled on this issue, i t
appears clear that the trend is towards including contingent
pension interests as marital assets.
This court has on numerous previous occasions
elucidated the wide range of discretion enjoyed by a trial
judge in making a division of marital property. No one is in
a better position than the trial judge who has heard all of
the testimony and observed the parties, to determine
fairness as between the parties.·

Modifying the order in

this case would necessitate restructuring the entire
property division.

It would most certainly require that the

wife's lien against the home be increased in value and
perhaps bear interest.

It also would reopen the issue of

alimony, inasmuch as Judge Christoffersen in making his
decision may have felt he had provided for the wife in later
years.

It would serve no useful purpose to relitigate all

of these issues.

13
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Judge Christoffersen's decision is in harmony with
prior Utah law.

As has already been shown, the Bennett case

is clearly distinguishable from this case.

Also U.C.A.

30-3-5 has been shown to be in harmony with the court's
ruling.

Finally, the most relevant precedent in Utah is

also in harmony with the Judge's ruling.

In Englert v.

Englert, this court ·stated:
"It is our opinion that the correct
view under our law is that this (UCA 30-3-5)
encompasses all of the assets of every
nature possessed by the parties, whenever
obtained and from whatever source derived;
and that this includes any such pension
fund or insurance." Englert v Englert,
576 P.2d 1274, 1276 Utah 1978.
{Emphasis
added) .
It must be concluded that when the court says "all of the
assets of every nature" this includes non-vested or
contingent pension interests.
Finally, the trial court's order should be affirmed
because the court's ruling involves sound social policy.
addressing this very issue in an article in the Journal of
Family Law, the authors state:
" ... sound social policy and the facts
of modern life dictate a recognition of
the claim on a public interest basis.
For example, inadequate attention has been
given to the plight of elderly women, fifty
percent of whom have incomes under $1,800 a
year. A pro rata interest in a former
husband's pension or retirement benefits
would improve the financial situation of
some elderly women who have been divorced.
In essence, these elderly women would benefit
by such an interest if they regularly
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In

obtained their share of benefit payments
when made ..• " Foster and Freed, Spousal
Rights in Retirement Pension Benefits, 16
Journal of Family Law 187 (1977-78).
A review of the facts of this case demonstrates the
truth of the authors' statements.

The evidence showed the

husband had worked for over 15 years and earns in excess of
$12.00 per hour plus fringe benefits.

The wife has very

little work experience and earns slightly over $4.00 per
hour at a job which provides no fringe benefits and provides
no retirement benefits {T-53).

CONCLUSION

This case presents the court with an important
opportunity.

An opportunity to establish a policy which is

logically and equitably sound.

Too often in the past,

various courts have proclaimed equality through equal
division of the marital assets.

Yet these very courts have

ignored the fact that some of the most valuable assets of
the marriage have remained outside the division and in the
husband's wallet.

This case presents the court with an

opportunity to provide more meaning to the concept of equal
rights.

It presents the court the opportunity to reaffirm

fairness as the basic principle of domestic property
divisions.

The trial court's decision should be affirmed as

a matter of law.
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DATED this

JD~

day of February, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,

MANN, HADFIELD AND THORNE
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